#Smartsvn master password reset windows

If it’s managed automatically by the authenticating DC its pretty good load balanced and you don’t need to rely on a script. In a large environment this could be quite consuming for the script to run. bit of and on again making the DC generate a new random password. One of the most common solutions to this is a scheduled task running a script changing the smart card user passwords e.g. If a malicious user gets on hold of the NTLM hash he can impersonate that user as long as it exists, since the password is set to never expire. The problem here is when a smart card user authenticates, the domain controller provides the client with the NTLM hash to support SSO. Using a smart card is a pretty good idea and it provides a strong authentication. The GINA or LogonUI components on the client check for the presence of the SMARTCARD_REQUIRED flag during an interactive logon (console or RDP) and reject the logon if it isn’t made with a smartcard when it is set for the user. In addition to this, the DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWORD flag on the account is set so that the user’s password never expires. Ticking the ‘Smart Card is required for interactive logon’checkbox for a user resets the password for that user to a random complex password that is unknown to anyone and the UserAccountControl attribute of the user gets the flag SMARTCARD_REQUIRED added to it. If we first take a look at the User Account Control: Smart card is required for interactive logon Or if we look at the object metadata the password attributes is updated:Īnd last we can extract the NTLM hashes with e.g. This can be seen on the pwdLastSet attribute on the user account: On my smart card user account I have enabled the User Account Control: Smart card is required for interactive logon.Įach time the smart card user authenticates and the password has expired, the password is automatically changed by the DC. New-ADFineGrainedPasswordPolicy -ComplexityEnabled:$true -LockoutDuration:”00:30:00″ -LockoutObservationWindow:”00:30:00″ -LockoutThreshold:”0″ -MaxPasswordAge:”00.00:05:00″ -MinPasswordAge:”00.00:00:00″ -MinPasswordLength:”120″ -Name:”Admin-Policy” -PasswordHistor圜ount:”24″ -Precedence:”1″ -ReversibleEncryptionEnabled:$false -Server:””Īdd-ADFineGrainedPasswordPolicySubject -Identity:”CN=Admin-Policy,CN=Password Settings Container,CN=System,DC=corp,DC=secid,DC=se” -Server:”” -Subjects:”CN=Danne,OU=Users,OU=Data Admins,OU=Admin,DC=corp,DC=secid,DC=se” Assigned it to one of my smart card user: With my tests I created a Fine-grained Password Policy with the password set to expire in 5 minutes. I demoted the 2012R2 DCs and raised the domain mode to WindowsThresholdDomain and now it gets interesting. Just to see if this has anything to do with PDC e more than the standard password management. Neither when I moved the PDC fsmo role to the 2016 Domain Controller. If you set it to True nothing fun happened.

#Smartsvn master password reset windows

If you promote a Windows Server 2016 Domain Controller in a 2012R2 domain (or older) the value is set to False. If we search for the attribute we can find it being used at the root of DNC No much more info when I tried to search the internet. This attribute controls whether the passwords on smart-card-only accounts expire in accordance with the password policy. Well, this sound interesting if you read the adminDescription: LDAPDisplayName: msDS-ExpirePasswordsOnSmartCardOnlyAccounts I was browsing thru the new schema updates in Windows Server TP 4 and found an interesting new attribute: ms-DS-Expire-Passwords-On-Smart-Card-Only-Accountsĭn: CN=ms-DS-Expire-Passwords-On-Smart-Card-Only-Accounts,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=XĬN: ms-DS-Expire-Passwords-On-Smart-Card-Only-AccountsĪdminDisplayName: ms-DS-Expire-Passwords-On-Smart-Card-Only-AccountsĪdminDescription: This attribute controls whether the passwords on smart-card-only accounts expire in accordance with the password policy.